Such compromises can be bad news not only for the climate, but also for the parties that are likely hoping to take advantage of these markets, as Mr Forrister explains: the exact form of this “robust” calculation of Article 6.2 is a priority of the ongoing negotiations, one of the technical challenges being to manage transactions between NDCs that target emissions in a single year, compared to those that set a carbon budget for several years. The second trading mechanism is introduced by Article 6.4, which creates a new international carbon market and a monitoring body for its activities. While Article 6.2 deals with trade between countries, Article 6.4 concerns projects implemented by “public and private bodies”. Article 6 could also provide a way to integrate corporate climate commitments into the broader UN process and replace previous trade agreements that many observers – and international actors themselves – now regard as virtually worthless. In addition, many registered CDM projects do not currently have RETs, but could generate them retroactively, says the OECD/IEA report. It adds that these “dormant” projects could in principle spend $4.7 billion. CERs by the end of 2020, for example, if market prices rise. “The difference between a Paris agreement with good markets and a Paris agreement with bad markets,” he says, “is a system in which we avoid climate disasters and a system where we hide only behind technical details and do not reduce a single ton of CO2.” The main source of discussion when considering how to apply The Section 6 contracts is the scope of its scope. While the Paris Agreement, in its current form, requires that the tax be levied on all Article 6.4 activities, many developing countries have insisted on extending it to Article 6.2.
“In practice, it is very difficult to establish a clear link between the ability to buy cheap emission credits and a country`s willingness to commit to strengthening climate protection. In some cases, it may be the opposite, as countries prefer to sell their emissions reductions rather than use them to achieve their own targets. The guarantee of bilateral trade under Article 6.2, the overall market mechanism of Article 6.4 and the non-trade framework of Article 6.8 are all satisfactorily resolved, while preserving the integrity of the Paris Agreement, which requires some “quite complex mathematics,” Tollmann said.